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Commodity agreements have been functioning for many years. However, it is
only recently that two agreements have been concluded which do not rule
out success in advance. One of these agreements is the 1986 cocoa agree-
ment. Using an annual model of the cocoa market this artícle analyses the
viability of the instruments agreed upon and explores ways and means to
improve the functioning of the agreement.
Keywords: Commodity agreement, price stabilization, buffer stock policy,
withholding.
1 INTRODUCTION
On the occasion of its adoption in July 1986 the new International Cocoa
Agreement was described by Kenneth Dadzie, Secretary-General of UNCTAD, as
'the first of a new generation of International Commodity Agreements'
(ICA) (UNCTAD 1986a). The justification for such a bold statement is that,
for the fírst time in history, the objective of an ICA is exclusively
geared towards the reduction of price fluctuations around the long term
market-determined trend. Stabilization of prices (and as a consequence
income) is the sole objective of the agreement (see article one of the
1986 cocoa agreement).
From a theoretical point of view there are some objections against the use
of the price trend as guideline for price stabilization, if the market
cannot be described by a linear model. From the work of Turnovsky (1976,
1978) and Nguyen (1979, 1980) we know that this is only warranted in case
the Waugh-Oi-Massell model is valid. In a general non-linear model with
multiplicative disturbances the arithmetic price trend will not lead to a
realistic buffer stock policy. Realistic in the sense that it fulfills the
requirements of (i) earnings stabilization and (ii) self-liquidation.
However, it can be shown that in case of a log-linear model the geometric
price trend is appropriate.
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The tin-disaster and other interventions, such as the Common Agricultural
Policy (CAP) of the European Commission, confirm the theory. The main
lesson is that buffer stock intervention should not go against the general
tendency of the market (or more precise: market prices). Incorporating
this lesson in a model of a commodity market means that the decision rule
for selling or buying by the buffer stock manager (i) should not alter the
market price trend determined by supply and demand and (ii) should not
ignore changes in prices induced by factors from outside the market. The
objective of this article is to see whether a decision rule can be formu-
lated for the buffer stock manager on how to act in order not to violate
these two principles and to analyse the viability of the 1986 cocoa agree-
ment with respect to these principles for a stabilization policy.
In section 2 we will briefly discuss the new cocoa agreement. In section 3
an annual model of the cocoa market and its main features are presented.
In section 4 the model will be used to formulate some heuristic rules for
market intervention. Section 5 contains the simulation results and a com-
parison of the effects of the agreement with the heuristic rule of section
4. The final section contains conclusions.
2 THE 1986 COCOA AGREEMENT
The cocoa agreements of 1972 and 1975 were not effective at all because
the cocoa price never was within the agreed price range. The agreement of
1980 on'y had a minor impact, although the buffer stock manager bought
100,000 mt in the 1981~82 season. The main reason for the ineffectiveness
of the agreements was that they did not contain provisions for (semi-)su-
tomatic revisions of the price range whenever necessary. The rubber agree-
ment of 1979 was the first commodity agreement with a semi-automatic ad-
justment of the range, partly related to changes in the size of the buffer
stock. In the 1987 Rubber Agreement the mechanism of semi-automatic ad-
justment of the price range was strengthened considerably.
However, the decisive factor in shaping the character of the recent cocoa
agreement was the collapse of the tin agreement in 1985, basically due to
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prolonged attempts to maintain the tin prices at an artificially high
level. As a direct consequence of this failure, the UNCTAD Committee on
Commodities decided on new guidelines for commodity agreements. The major
point of these guidelines was that future agreements should be designed in
such a way that they take into account developments in market prices to a
larger degree (UNCTAD 1987).
The 1986 cocoa agreement is characterized by a relatively wide price
range, two stabilization instruments and a high degree of price flexibili-
ty (UNCTAD 1986b). In the agreement the upper and lower intervention pri-
ces ('must sell' and 'must buy' prices) have been set at 267 US-dollar
cents and 187 US dollar cents per kilo respectively, or at a distance of
40 US-dollar cents from the reference price of 227 US-dollar cents per
kilo (SDR 1.935 et the time of adoption of the agreement; UNCTAD 1986a).
This means a range of t 17.6x from the reference price, which is smaller
than the range in the 1979 rubber agreement (t 20X) (UNCTAD 1980), but
wider than the range of the 1980 cocoa agreement (} 15.4X) (UNCTAD 1982).
The principal instrument in the new agreement is a buffer stock of 250,000
mt (as in the agreement of 1980) with the possibility of an additional
100,000 mt should the agreement (after three years) be extended for a
period of more than one year. The stock resulting from the old agreement
(100,000 mt) and a capital of 250 million US-dollar have been transferred
to the new agreement. Additional funds for buffer stock operations will
continue to come from a levy of 2 US-dollar cents per lb.
An interesting new feature of the 1986 agreement is a r.iithholding scheme.
This is essentially a system of national stocks (kept in store by the
buffer stock manager) up to a maximum of 120,000 mt. The scheme becomes
operative (in tranches of 30,000 mt) once the buffer has reached 200,000
mt or the manager runs out of funds. The impact of withholding is the same
as buying by the buffer stock manager. However, there is a significant
difference in the unloading of these two types of stocks. Stocks from the
buffer are sold whenever the price reaches the upper intervention level.
Withholdings are already released at the reference price; so, only the
lower half of the price range is relevant for this instrument.
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The most important new feature of the 1986 cocoa agreement is the flexibi-
lity of the price range due to two types of semi-automatic adjustment of
the intervention prices. The first type relates to the annual príce re-
vte~. In case the average indicator price over the preceding year has
been outside the range, the intervention prices will be increased (de-
creased) to such an extent that the indicator price comes at a distance of
6 US-dollar cents from the intervention price within the range, with a
maximum adjustment of 13 US-dollar cents per kilo, unless the Cocoa Coun-
cil decides otherwise by special vote.
The second type of semi-automatic adjustment is triggered by a change tn
the size of the actually held buffer stock of ~5,000 mt within a six month
period. In that case the adjustment of the intervention prices is 13 US-
dollar cents per kilo. In the earlier cocoa agreement the comparable ad-
justment mechanism was almost 9 US-dollar cents per kilo. Taking both
semi-automatic adjustments into account it turns out that the 1986 cocoa
agreement contains the most flexible adjustment of the price range that
has ever been incorporated in a commodity agreement.
A not unimportant novelty of the 1986 agreement is that all prices are
expressed in SDR's. Using the SDR as a denominator instead of the US dol-
lar has the advantage that the prices of the agreement are less distorted
by all changes of the dollar vis a vis the major other currencies ín the
world. A substantial appreciation or depreciation of the dollar will in-
fluence the nominal cocoa prices expressed in dollars. By using the SDR as
a denominator, these price changes will be mitigated. Theoretically one
should use a basket of the currencies of all major consumer countries,
with a weighting of the currencies according to their shares in cocoa
consumption. However, the SDR is an acceptable substitute as unit of ac-
count.
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3 A SIMPLE MODEL OF THE COCOA MARKET
Cocoabeans are produced in developing countries and cocoa products are
mainly consumed in developed countries. This dichotomy was used in formu-
lating a model of the world cocoa market, where the producers and consu-
mers are countries or regions. The regions are arranged in such a way that
the amount of beans imported by producing regions, and the amount of beans
exported by consuming regions, can be neglected. (Instead of beans, bean
equivalents were used, since all exports and imports of intermediary pro-
ducts were transformed into bean equivalents.) Suan Tan (1984) reviews the
theory underlying the construction of this type of model. The sampling
period is 1955-1982 and the data originate mainly from FAO publications,
the International Cocoa Organization and Gill 8~ Duffus.
The producing countries or regions are Cameroon, Ghana, Nigeria, Ivory
Coast, Africa Rest, Brazil, Rest South America and Asia and Oceanis. The
(normal) production of cocoabeans QR is based on two factors, the area
planted and the (average) production per acre. In contrast to Akiyama and
Duncan (1982), who introduce two different relations, one for acreage and
one for yields, only one relation for the production of cocoabeans per
country or region is introduced in the present model. The reason for this
is that the data for acreage are unreliable (FAO 1985). Besides, under
fairly realistic assumpti.ons it is not necessary to introduce two rela-
tions (Ady 1968; Bateman 1965). The decision on acreage and production is
based on the development (or expectations) of real producer prices PFI~PC
as an indicator for profit expectations. This leads to
e(ln(91tt)) - RO t ~p8~ptlln(PCI,t-p } ~91n(~t-1) . (1)
The consuming regions are North America, Western Europe, Eastern Europe
(including the USSR) and Rest of the developed World. Cocoa consumption
per capita CC~POP is based on real gross per capita income GNPR~POP and
real cocoa prices. The real import price PI~PC is used to represent the
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real cocoa price. The real price of sugar PS~PC is introduced to account
for possible substitution or complementary products. As a measure for
cocoa consumption grindings are used, adding the imports of powder, paste
and butter transformed into bean equivalents, in order to cover the change
in imports from beans to intermediary products, especially in the trade
between North-America and Brazil. The specification used is:
ln( (POP, t) - AO ;~lln( (G POPPC, t) ~ A21n( (P~, t) (2)
PS CC
} ~31n( (PC, t) } S41n( (POP t-i) .
The price system contains relations for producer prices PFI in home-cur-
rency, for export prices PE and import prices PI in US-dollar cents. Due
to government policy and quality differences, export and import prices and
the world market price PICCO are not only related through the exchange
rates RE. For all these price equations an autoregressive distributed lag
model of the first order is used. Note that by restricting the parameters
it can be tested what functional form is appropriate, i.e. an error cor-
rection mechanism, adaptive expectations, etc. The resulting specifica-
tions are
FIt - x1PEtxREt } x2PEt-1xREt-1 ` x3PFIt-1
PEt - xiPICCOt t x2PICCOt-1 } x3PEt-1
PIt - x1PICCOt 4 x2PICCOt-1 t x3PIt-1 '
(3)
(5)
The world market cocoa price PICCO depends on the difference between world
supply and demand. Supply QRWT is the sum of production per country or
region. Demand for grindings GRWT is the sum of demand for grindings per
region. The definitional equation for total demand for grindings GRWT also
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includes an autonomous component CCRR to account for imports in countries
or regions which are not modelled explicitly. Differences in supply and
demand will also induce changes 4STW'T in free stocks (the factor .99 ac-
counts for transportation losses). It is assumed that consuming regions
keep a fraction of the demand for grindings in stock for production of
cocoa products. This desired level of stocks is set equal to the average
level of stocks over the period 1962-1982, which is 30X of total grin-
dings GRWT. In as far as last years stocks STWT differ from the desired
level this difference will have a negative effect on the price for cocoa.
In a situation of changing demand this will also induce a change in the
demand for stocks by .30xeGRWT, which has to be added to the demand for
consumption in order to obtain total demand GRWTt.30~GRWT. Since markets
are not independent, the commodity price index CPI is included in the
specification in order to separate the effect of differences in supply and
demand on the cocoa market from the spill-over effects from other markets.
Indicators for the instability of monetary variables did not have any
significant influence. The relevant definitional equations are
~~t - `i-1QRti
GRWTt - ~~-1GRt~ t CCRRt
szwrt - s~wrt-i t [.99XoRwTt - GRwTt]






STWT - .30xGRWT- a3 t-i t-1 t ~41n(PICCOt-i). (9)GRWTt-1
The model also includes a submodel for the calculation of the opportunity
costs and operational result of buffer stock operations. The opportunity
costs are based on the cash-flow from buying and selling cocoabeans by the
buffer stock manager, minus the interest on an annual virtual loan to
t-1
10
finance the buffer operations, minus the costs of keeping the beans in a
warehouse in the United Kingdom (storage, insurance, rotation). The inte-
rest paid is based on a real interest rate of five per cent per year. The
estimated costs of keeping 1000 MT of cocoabeans in stock are based on
information gathered by UNCTAD (UNCTAD 1975) and private correspondence
with the ICCO. The costs are indexed on Manufacters Unit Value (MUV). The
operational result is equal to the opportunity costs without the annual
loan to finance the buffer, but including the interest gained from the
surplus funds of the ICCO. These surplus funds are what remains of the
contributions -2 US-dollar cents per lb- after the bufferstock operations.
The operational result is of special interest to the members of the ICCO,
since it indicates to what extent the buffer operations need extra finance
apart from the arrangements already made.
Implementation of the Agreement in the Model
The agreement contains two instruments and two adjustment mechanisms for
the price range (see section 2) which have to be translated in terms of
the model. Since the model is based on annual data our interpretation of
the instruments in the agreement will deviate from their exact content.
(i) The buffer stock can be implemented easily in equation (4). This is
not the case for adjustment of the intervention prices by 13 US cents per
kilo if the buffer stock manager has to sell or buy ~5,000 mt within six
months. In the model this was translated into an adjustment of interven-
tion prices each time the buffer stock manager has sold (bought) ~5,000
tons within one year. After one adjustment within one period, the simula-
tion was restarted using the adjusted intervention prices. The program
allows for two of these adjustments within one period.
(ii) Withholding has the same effect on prices as a buffer stock mutation.
In the model, withholding starts when the maximum buffer of 250,000 mt has
been reached, up to a maximum of 120,000 mt, without employing tranches.
Withholdings are sold whenever the actual cocoa price exceeds the refe-
rence price. The amount sold will keep the actual price equel to the refe-
rence price.
(iii) Implementation of the annual price review is straightforward.
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(iv) The intervention prices are adjusted each calender year instead of
each cocoa year.
Implications of the Model
Instead of all the detailed information on the estimation results, only
the effects of the world cocoa price PICCO on production and consumption,
and the effect of a change in real gross national income per capita are
reported. These effects are given in table 1 and table 2. Compared to
other
Table 1: Price elacticities of Cocoa Production
Short Run Long Run
Cameroon .13 .73
Ghana .10 . 38
Ivory Coast .42 .82
Nigeria .20 .47
Brazil .25 .29
Rest Latin America .14 .28
Asia and Oceania .0 .50
World Total .23 .54
Remark: Short Run means current and 1 year lag.
Long Run means steady state elasticity.
For Africa Rest we used a dummy equation which describes
the development of production over time.
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Table 2: Price and Income Elasticities of cocoa consumption
price income
short run long run short run long run
North America -.19 -.25 .21 .25
Western Europe -.11 -.15 .25 .30
Eastern Europe f USSR -.14 -.26 .44 .66
Rest World -.26 -.40 .42 .5~
world Total -.16 -.23 .30 .39
studies of the cocoa market by the World Bank (Akiyama and Duncan 1982)
and the International Cocoa Organization ICCO (1984) the results for North
America and Western Europe are of the same magnitude. For Eastern Europe
and the USSR the price elasticities obtained differ. This is partially due
to differences in the definition of the region. With respect to the rest
of the developed world the results are close to those of the ICCO, but
differ from the results of the World Bank. There are, however, no real
anomalies between the various results, only differences in magnitude.
The short run price elasticities of production and consumption are quite
low. The short run elasticity of production for the world is fifty per
cent higher than the corresponding elasticity of consumption. The diffe-
rence in magnitude increases over time. This is due to the fact that in
the short run producers can only react on prices by taking better care of
the existing stock of trees. In the long run the stock of trees can be
adjusted.
The income elasticities, both in the short and the long run, are low in
North America and Europe, which points at saturation of the market. In
Eastern Europe and the USSR, and the rest of the developed world income
elasticities are considerably higher.
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Simulation Exercises
In order to test the strength and weakness of the 1986 cocoa agreement, a
number of simulation experiments were performed, based on the following
assumptions: a zero growth and an annual two and three percent growth over
a period of 25 years of the commodity price index CPI (for the sake of
simplicity identified with the period 1986-2010). Fluctuations amund the
trend are constructed by calculating the trend over the past and taking
the dif- ference between this trend and the actual data. The fluctuations
obtained thus are added to the trend used for the different experiments.
These different assumptions are necessary in order to see if the agreement
is robust enough to adapt to an inflationary environment. Fluctuations are
introduced by taking the historical differences of the actual values of
the commodity price index CPI and its geometrical mean. Since the exchange
rates are exogenous it is assumed that they are constant over the simula-
tion period. The consumption prices are linked to the development in the
commodity price index. In this way unneccessary complications as a conse-
quence of differences in development of exogenous variables are avoided.
The free simulation of the model performed reasonably well (measured in
Theil's inequality coefficient) over the period 1968-1980.
4 A HEURISTIC RULE FOR INTERVF.N'TION
In the literature two types of stabilization policies are distinguished.
The first one is a band width rule or price range. The price range has as
a disadvantage that it restricts the price variation to a pre-specified
range and does not take into account circumstances from outside the market
which might force the price out of the range. The second one is a price
adjustment rule which means that the buffer stock manager keeps the price
as close as possible to a pre-specified target price path. This kind of
rule results from an optimal control formulation of the problem. The dis-
advantages of an optimal control formulation of the problem are that it
restricts the functional form of the model to linear models, and that it
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is necessary to model an objective function explicitly. Another dis-
advantage is that all future target prices for the planning horizon have
to be known in advance in order to be able to apply the rule (Lee and
Blandford 1980; Ghosh et al. 1982). The 1986 cocoa agreement is a mixture
of both policies: there is a price range of 80 US-dollar cents and there
are two instruments to keep the price within the range, and there are also
two instruments to adjust the reference or target price (see section 2).
The question is: do these instruments enable the buffer stock manager to
reduce the varíance of the cocoa price and~or is it possible to formulate
a better rule for application of one or more of the instruments?
The policy implicit in the agreement can be formulated as a simple closed
loop buffer stock rule of the form
r
where PICCOt is the target price, oBSTt the change in bufferstock and CPIt
the expected commodity price index. This approach seems more realistic
than applying optimal control given the practical situation the buffer
stock manager has to deal with. A disadvantage is that it is not possible
to prove that the agreement leads to optimal results. It can only be shown
that over a longer period of time ít is satisficing.
In order to be able to do this the two principles of section 1 have to be
translated into variables of the model. Translation of the principle that
a decision rule should adjust for fluctuations in supply and demand in
such a way that it does not effect the price trend induced by supply and
demand, but only reduce the variance of the price, means that two condi-




QRWTt - (GRWTt t .30e(GRWPt)) - o(BSTit) (li)
STWTt-1 - .30XGRWft-1 - ~(BST2t) . (12)
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(11) implies short term market equilibrium, whereas (11) and (12) together
imply long term equilibrium because stocks are at their desired level. The
total buffer stock mutation necessary to achieve the desired target of
long term market equilibrium is
eBSTt - eBSTit . eBST2t . (13)
This condition is the target for the buffer stock manager. Implementation
in (9) leads to a pragmatic target price which is calculated every period
w
PICCOt - exp{a0 t alln(CPIt) t a41n(PICCOt-1}. (14)
Since the adjustment eBSTt is based on production, consumption and stocks
of cocoabeans only, this rule for evaluating the target price from year to
year is called the rule of 'internal growth'.
The remainder of this article will examine the effect of the agreement on
the variability of the international cocoa price and on the variability of
income. As a yardstick for variability the following instability index is
used (for a general discussion on instability indices, see Offutt 1986):
II - J I n~i-1(xt- x0(1}x)t)2,, xmean' (15)
With x- 0 and an appropriate x0 this is equsl to the coefficient of va-
riation. In what follows the policy results are compared with the results




In the case of a zero growth trend in prices, the agreement does not af-
fect the world production and consumption of cocoabeans (on average -1,800
mt and ~1,600 mt respectively on an average annual world production of
approximately 1.9 milion mt). There is no change in the market shares of
the different countries and regions either, which implies that the agree-
ment is neutral with respect to production and consumption. On average,
income and spendings are -.25X lower compared to the free simulation, due
to a small decline of the cocoa price (-1.4 US-dollar cent per kilo). This
implies that the agreement is also neutral with respect to the nominal
variables. So the agreement is in line with the new Unctad guidelines
(section 2).






PICCO 36.9X 26.8X 27.3X
PICCO~CPIG 29.1X 24.3X 16.7X
Income:
Brazil 20.4X 16.5X 18.9X
Rest Latin America 24.5X 21.2X 13.4X
Cameroon 27.2X 23.3X 14.3X
Ghana 47.7X 41.6X 12.9X
Ivory Coast 21.5X 17.6X 17.9X
Nigeris 53.OX 47.6X 10.1X
Rest Africa 30.9X 27.4X 11.4X
Asia 8~ oceania 9.4X 8.1X 13.7X
Tota1 2o.1X 17.5X 12.9X
Because of the intervention the instability index of cocoa prices is redu-
ced from 36.9 (frcïe simulation) to 26.8 ( see table 3), a reduction of more
than 25 per cent. As a corollary the amplitude of the price range is redu-
ced considerably: the highest price over the 25-year period decreases from
282 to 263 US-dollar cents per kilo, and the lowest price increases from
161 to 1~1 US-dollar cents per kilo. The lowest price instability index
attainable within the agreement price range of . 40 US-dollar cents is
19.3, based on an unlimited buffer and no price adjustment mechanism. So,
the degree of stabilization reached (26.8) is quite satisfactory.
The stabilization of income of the exporting countries (equal to the ex-
penditures of importing regions) is less significant. The index decreases
from 20.1 to 1~.5, the two largest producers gaining the most in terms of
stabilization of income. Note, however, that all individual producing
countries gain from the agreement in terms of stabilization of income.
This result is achieved with a limited number of interventions. The buffer
stock manager, starting with a stock of 100,000 mt, buys stocks only once,
150,000 mt in 1990, which implies an adjustment of the price range by two
times 13 US-dollar cents. The price range which was 18~-26~ US-dollar
cents at the beginning, becomes 161-241 US-dollar cents, and the buffer is
at its maximum level. The buffer stock manager uses the instrument of
withholding only in 1997 (64,400 mt) in order to keep the price range
constant. In the following two years 39,600 mt and 25,000 mt are sold,
since in these years the price of cocoabeans becomes larger than the refe-
rence price of 201 US-dollar cents. The price range remains constant until
the year 2008. To keep it constant the buffer stock manager sells 93,400
mt in the period from 2002 till 2005 without triggering an adjustment
mechanism. In the year z0o8 ~5,000 mt are sold and the price range becomes
1~4-254 US-dollar cents. In 2009 the remainder of the buffer is sold,
which implies a new price range resulting from the fact that more than
~5,000 mt are sold. However, in that year the price range is also adjusted
as a result of the fact that the price of cocoabeans lies outside the
range at the end of the year; consequently the price rsnge becomes 200-280
US-dollar cents in the year 2010.
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It turns out that the agreement is easily self-supporting. The operational
result is on average 90 million US-dollars a year. The opportunity costs
of the buffer ~tock operations are on average 22.~ million US-dollars a
year, which is a rather low price for the stabilization achieved. It is
only .5z of the avarage value of production. These figures are based on
the assumption that the existing 1985 stock of 100,000 mt was bought at
1985 prices.
Variations on the Agreement Policy
Several factors indicate that the agreement can be improved upon. First,
the buffer stock is not very active (6 out of 25 periods). Second, the
withholding instrument is hardly used. Third, the mechanísm of adjustment
of the price range at the end of the calendar year is used only once. All
this means that the flexibility (13 US-dollar cents) triggered by changes
of ~5,000 mt in the síze of the buffer stock, and activated four times
under the agreement policy, is too high, given the price range of . 40 US-
dollar cents. There are two ways in which this flexibility can be reduced,
by smaller adjustments of the reference price, and by reducing the price
range.
First, the flexibility was reduced by 50z (from 13 US-dollar cents to 6.5
US dollar cents). This results in a better performance; see table 4,
agreement less flexible. This better result is attained at limited addi-
tional opportunity costs (US-dollar 9 million per year). The instability
index for cocoa prices drops to 21.~ and the index for income to 14.4.
This result comes close to the maximum attainable stabilization with an
unlimited buffer stock; table 4, agreement max buffer stock. As under the
agreement, this alternative policy stabilizes the income of every indivi-
dual country~region and has hardly any influence on total income, produc-
tion, consumption and average cocoa prices. Also in this case the buffer
seems self-liquidating.
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free simu- 36.9X 20.1X - -
lation
agreement 26.8X 17.5X 92.1 22.7
agreement, 21.7X 14.4X 54.5 31.5
less flexible
agreement, 19.3X 12.6X 60.4 117.1
max buffer
agreement, 24.5X 18.4X 92-4 22.3
t 30 US-cents
agreement, 20.9X 16.4X 101.8 12.9
. 20 US-cents
agreement, 20.1X 15.4X 89-5 25-3
t 10 US-cents
The very positive outcome of this variation on the agreement is not due to
the fact that the buffer i5 more active. Rather, this case demonstrates
the possible effect of activities of the withholding scheme. This scheme
is active in twelve out of the twenty five years. However, it functions
only in the lower half of the price range. Therefore, during this period,
the prices are in fact kept within a range of 40 US-dollarcents under the
reference price.
Further sensitivity analysis of the 75,000 mt price adjustment showed that
the result could not be improved upon. There is also a good balance be-
tween flexibility and size of tne instruments. Increasing the maximum
buffer stock and~or the maximum withholdings does not lead to better re-
sults.
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The alternative for a reduction of flexibility is a narrowing of the price
range. The most significant result was reached after reducing the range to
t 20 US dollar cunts. The result of this reduction is almost equel to the
result of the variation on the agreement with reduced flexibility; see
table 4. The only, but important, difference is that the costs of stabili-
zation are much lower, amounting to less than 13 million US-dollars per
year. Further reduction of the price range leads to a slightly better
result but at the expense of doubling the real costs of the agreement.
The results of a policy with a t20 US-dollar cents price range can not be
improved upon by changes in the mix of instruments. The result does not
depend on an active withholding mechanism. The buffer is very active and -
at least as important- the price adjustment mechanism becomes operational
quite frequently. As with the other variations discussed, the policy is
neutral with respect to the long run market trend.
Till now the operation of the agreement has been analysed in an inflation
free world. Next, the effect of inflation on the functioning of the agree-
ment is analysed.
The Agreement in an Inflationary World
In an inflationary world the agreement becomes ineffective after a number
of years. The higher the rate of inflation, the shorter this period will
be. In case of an annual increase in the trend of the commodity price
index CPI of lx per year, the buffer manager buys 130,000 mt in 1990,
which keeps the price within the range for a total period of twelve years.
Then inflation catches up with the price range. The price range is gra-
dually increased in the following years, and the buffer is empty within
two years (after the twelfth year). The buffer remains empty and becomes
ineffective. Because of the operations of the buffer stock, the price
stability index declines from 3~.9 to 28.~, but incomes are only marginal-
ly stabilized; see table 5. This implies that the agreement is not neutral
with respect to price changes from outside the market.
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Table 5: Major results under alternative assumptions on inflation
result instability instability operational opportunity
` index prices index income result costs
Policy
6 610 U~ 10 US
OX inflation
free simu- 36.9X 20.1X - -
lation
agreement 26.8X 17.5X 92.1 22.7
agreement, 20.9X 16.4X 101.8 12.9
t 20 U~-cents
internal 16.6X 15.4X 102.6 11.9
growth t5X
1X inflation
free simu- 37.9X 19.8X - -
lation
agreement 28.7X 18.9X 138.8 14.7
agreement, 24.2X 18.7X 160.5 - 7.1
t 20 US-cents
internal 16.OX 15.4X 136.6 16.1
growth t5X
3X inflation
free simu- 38.1X 19.1X - -
lation
agreement 29.4X 18.2X 294.7 -39.4
agreement, 23.OX 18.2X 291.9 -36.5
t 20 US-cents
internal 18.6X 16.9X 211.5 40.2
growth t5X
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In case the rate of inflation doubles or triples, the period after which
the agreement becemes ineffective in ten and seven years respectively. The
stabilizing effect is therefore less than in the case of one percent in-
flation.
These results indicate that even a moderate rate of inflation paralyzes
the functioning of the agreement. Consequently, given the structure of the
agreement, it will be necessary to renegotiate the price range regularly.
With one percent inflation renegotiation is necessary every five years,
and in case of three percent inflation at least every three years. The
question is: can these regenotiations be avoided?
Application oP the rule of Internal Growth
If the buffer stock manager would base his policy on (13) and (14), long
term market equilibrium can be achieved. In order to apply this rule, it
is assumed that the expected commodity price index CPIt is equsl to the
actual commodity price index CPIt. This rule of 'internal growth' is supe-
rior to the agreement in all cases; see table 5. A range of plus~minus
five percent is used for practical reasons, not every minor difference in
demand and supply has to be taken into account, only larger ones are of
interest. (Turnovsky (1978), and Newberry and Stiglitz (1982) emphasize
that in a theoretical setting, perfect price stability is either not feas-
ible or infinitely costly.) Note that incomes too are stabilized to a
greater extent. Moreover, in the case of zero growth the opportunity costs
of this policy are also lower if compared with the agreement.
In an inflationary world the results under a rule of internal growth
plus~minus five percent do not deteriorate. Stabilization is reached,
although at a certain price. This is in sharp contrast with the agreement,
which becomes ineffective. As in the case of the agreement in a non-infla-
tionary world, the rule of internal growth is also neutral with respect to
the long term trend of the world cocoa market. Neither production nor




The semi-automatic price adjustment mechanism and the two intervention
instruments of the 1986 cocoa agreement augur well for its success. It is
quite likely that the agreement has a substantial stabilizing effect on
prices and incomes. The operational result of the buffer stock under va-
rious circumstances, indicates that no additional funding is required to
finance the buffer stock operations. The opportunity costs are also relat-
ively low. The analysis indicates, moreover, that the effectiveness of the
agreement can considerably be enhanced by halving the width of the price
range. An essentiial pre-condition for success of the agreement is, how-
ever, that its potential flexibility is fully utilized. The dispute over
price adjustment and withholdings that arose in the spring of 1988 between
producers and consumers, is therefore most unfortunate.
However, even only moderate inflation of world commodity prices will make
the agreement ineffective after a few years. Consequently periodical and
most likely cumbersome renegotiations of the price range will be neces-
sary.
The functioning of the agreement can be improved by the application of a
rule which is neutral with respect to disturbances from outside the mar-
ket, but which neutralises the internal disturbances. Price stabilization
would be reached to a higher degree and periodical renegotiation of the
price range would no longer be necessary.
Application of the rule of internal growth is only possible when the price
development of commodity price index CPI for the current period is known.
This means that the buffer manager needs a good indicator for the develop-
ment of this price index based on information from the best equipped orga-
nizations. It seems, however, that the ICCO, possibly in co-operation with
organizations like the IMF, the World Bank and~or the FAO, should be able
to make projections which are reliable enough to apply a buffer policy
based on the 'internal growth' rule. With this requirement fulfilled,
24
practical application of such an heuristic rule is still not without pro-
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